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Abstract 
Korea, an emerging donor country, highly considers its economic relations to recipients when 
allocating its aid. Such practices were preceded by Japan before the 1990s. We expect those 
similar practices between the two countries will make resemblance in aid outcomes. On a macro 
level we show similarities in aid allocations by type, region, income, and sector. The similarities 
are ascertained also at a micro level by our statistical analysis on the relationships between aid 
and FDI. The analysis based on FDI gravity model and panel dynamic system GMM estimation 
shows that only aids from Korea and Japan create more inflow of FDI to their recipient 
developing countries. Those contrast with other donors’ aids which are not related to FDI or 
substitute for FDI. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Now, Korea is one of foreign aid donors, though it is not yet a member of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. Korea’s giving of official 
development assistance (ODA) started in 1987 with the establishment of the Economic 
Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF), which aimed at providing concessional loans to 
developing countries. Later, with the introduction of the organization for technical 
cooperation, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) in 1991, the 
framework for foreign aid was built up in Korea. In 2006 Korea’s total foreign aid 
amounted to US$513 million, which was approximately ten times as large as in 1991. 
Compared to the aid from DAC members, the size of Korea’s aid is still small. Korean 
government, however, plans to increase its size progressively and become a member of 
the DAC in 2012. 
Under the circumstances, which direction or what goals Korea’s aid should go for has 
been much discussed and, nevertheless, its direction or goal has not been determined yet. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and NGOs insist that presently, Korea’s 
foreign aid is biased toward the pursuit of national economic interests and, therefore, the 
humanitarian elements should be strengthened. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy and enterprises insist that the foreign aid continues to be helpful to 
exports and foreign investment by Korean enterprises.   
The foreign aid intrinsically has two sides: the international practices of 
humanitarianism on one hand, and the means of pursuing national interests on the other 
hand. Such a dispute, therefore, can be seen not only in Korea, but in most donor 
countries. Only the outcome of how both sides are mixed varies across the donors, which 
is determined by their own economic, social, and historical backgrounds. The foreign aid 
by DAC members can be classified into types according to their features. Korea’s aid also 
is supposed to find its own shape and finally fall into one of the types. 
In many respects, Korea’s foreign aid until now shows a strong similarity to Japan’s 
aid in the past. This may be revealed by the allocation of aid funds from the two countries, 
which will be shown in section 2. Previously, Japan’s aid, in particular before the 1990s, 
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was characterized by the strong ties with its external economic relations such as foreign 
trade and investment, which used to cause some criticism from international society.  
This paper was initiated from the question of whether Korea’s foreign aid will follow 
Japan’s previous path. First, we will review the similarity in aid fund allocations between 
Korea in the 2000s and Japan in the 1980s using basic statistics. Furthermore, we will 
focus on the relationships between ODA and FDI and whether there is any similarity 
between the two countries’ aid in respect to their relationships. In case a donor allocates 
its aid money across developing countries considering its external economic relations, its 
ODA can be expected to have some relationship to its FDI. Therefore, we can expect that 
some relationships between ODA and FDI will be found in the cases of Japan and Korea 
because it is usually believed that Japan’s aid was allocated with consideration to its 
economic ties with the recipients, and Korea also seems to copy Japan’s experience. 
 
 
2. Basic comparison between Korea’s and Japan’s foreign aid 
 
 2.1. Aid allocation 
 
The total amount of Korea’s foreign aid has increased gradually for the last 17 years 
and reached US$513 million in 2006, which is shown in Figure 1. This is larger than aid 
of Portugal or Greece, and is a little less than aid of Finland. The share of ODA in GNI 
also was as low as 0.02% in 1990, but increased to hover around 0.06% in the 2000s. 
This level, however, is still much lower compared with most of the DAC members. The 
share of DAC members, on average, in 2006 was 0.31%, which was about five times as 
high as that of Korea.  
In 2006 Japan provided foreign aid of $11.2 billion on a net disbursement basis. This 
size accounted for 0.25% of its GNI. Japan was the third largest donor in the world 
following the United States and the United Kingdom. The size of Korea’s foreign aid is 
very tiny in terms of total amount or the share in GNI compared with that of Japan. Its 
total amount is only about one-twentieth, and its share in GNI is about one-fourth of 
Japan’s aid. 
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Despite a big difference in their sizes, Korea’s aid allocation shows a lot of 
similarities to Japan’s to a surprising extent. In particular, Korea’s allocation is closer to 
that of Japan in the second half of the 1980s than now. Table 1 shows the basic picture of 
aid fund allocations in Korea and Japan. The recent allocation in Korea are compared to 
those of two periods in Japan, the second half of 1980s and the latest years. The second 
half of 1980s is selected because Japan’s national income per capita during that period 
was at a similar level to the present one of Korea in nominal value, approximately 
US$20,000. In 1988 Japan’s national income per capita reached more than US$20,000 for 
the first time. In order to avoid the problem of annual volatility in aid allocation, we used 
five-year averages in every case. 
We can easily find out some similarities between Korea and Japan in aid fund 
allocation. First, Japan’s aid is characterized by a large share of loans in bilateral aid in 
the past and now. Korea’s aid also shows the same features, which is shown in the share 
of loans, 41%. Though its share is not as high as the 63% of Japan in the late 1980s, it is 
much higher than the average of DAC members, 14%. In addition, if we look at the 
period of 1998–2001 instead of the latest year when a large amount of Korea’s aid 
temporarily went to Afghanistan and Iraq for war recovery, Korea’s share of loans goes 
up to 69%, which is slightly higher than Japan’s share in the late 1980s. In the regional 
distribution, the two countries show similarities in the high concentration in the Asian 
region. The 76% of Korea’s bilateral aid was provided to developing Asian countries, and 
similarly, 67% of Japan’s aid was given to Asia in the late 1980s. Contrastingly, the 
shares of aid to Africa by Korea and Japan are as low as 8% and 10% respectively, 
compared to the DAC average of 29%.  
In terms of aid recipients by income we can see a similarity between Korea’s and 
Japan’s aid. Korea’s aid is characterized by the high ratio of the aid to the middle income 
countries. In the period 2002–2006 Korea provided 52% of its bilateral aid to the lower-
middle-income countries, which contrasts with 30% of the DAC average. When we 
reasonably expect that the unallocated income countries are likely to fall into lower 
income groups, its share of aid to three lower income groups including LDCs, other LICs, 
and the unallocated income countries is 21% points lower than the DAC average. 
Therefore, Korea’s aid allocation by recipients’ income is preceded by that of Japan. The 
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recipient by income in Table 1 shows how close Korea’s distribution is to that of Japan in 
the late 1980s.   
In the allocation by sector, Korea seems to be much different from Japan and instead 
closer to the DAC average. One of traditional features of Japanese aid distinct from other 
DAC members’ is its emphasis on economic infrastructure in the recipient countries. In 
the late 1980s, more than half of its bilateral aid was allocated in the economic 
infrastructure sector, and also, in the most recent five years, 45% of its aid went to the 
same sector. During the most recent five years, Korea showed much different proportions 
from those of Japan. The economic infrastructure sector accounted for only 29%, whereas 
about two-thirds of its aid went to the social infrastructure sector. Such a partition, 
however, is an unusual and temporary outcome which arises from a sharp increase in 
urgent war relief aid to Afghanistan and Iraq after 2002. During the five years before 
2002, the economic infrastructure accounted for 46%, which was instead higher than its 
social infrastructure share and was as high as Japan's economic infrastructure share. 
Finally, in terms of aid-tying, Korea’s aid is much different from Japan’s. Most of 
Korea’s bilateral aid of the most recent five years, 97% was provided with the condition 
of tying, which is in sharp contrast to other donors’ practices of aid untying. Only 8% of 
Japanese aid was given with the condition of tying during the last five years. The 
proportion of tied aid in Japan’s aid had been higher than the DAC average until 1981, 
but after the peak of 74% in 1980, its proportion sharply declined to 32% on average in 
the late 1980s. Korea’s common practice of aid tying seems to be very unusual, even with 
the comparison to the Japan’s past. 
In summary, except for size and aid tying, Korea’s aid has a close similarity to 
Japan’s aid of the late 1980s in many respects such as aid allocation by type, sector, 
region, and income. The similarities between the two countries’ aid include a high 
proportion of loans, the regional concentration in Asia, a high share of aid to the middle-
income countries, and the emphasis on the economic infrastructure sector. 
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 2.2. Aid typology 
 
The similarity in aid allocations between Korea and Japan implies that Korea’s aid 
practice, in general, will possibly follow Japan’s past one. How the aid funds of a certain 
country are allocated might well reveal the nature or the goals that the country tries to 
achieve through its aid. Park (2007) tentatively classified 21 DAC donor countries into 
four groups according to the features of their aid practice. The classification was based on 
an ample store of previous studies on aid allocations by individual donors (Shraedor, 
Hook, and Taylor 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Berthelemy and Tichit 2004, etc.).  
Their aid practices could be grouped into four types: humanitarianism, ex-colony 
management, economic relation, and national security. Donors of the humanitarianism 
type give relatively significant consideration to the necessity of the recipients in 
allocating their aid. All the Scandinavian countries are included in this group. These 
countries have in common a strong tradition of social democracy. The countries of the ex-
colony management type provide their foreign aid with the aim of maintaining the 
political and economic relationships with its recipients, mostly former colonies. France, 
Belgium, Australia, Portugal, and the UK fall under this category. They allocated more 
than half of their total aid to the countries that were their former colonies. The aid of the 
economic-relation type is one in which aid allocations are deeply related to economic ties 
between a donor and its recipients. Donors of this type tend to provide most of their aid to 
poor countries to which they have strong ties in terms of trade or overseas investment. 
Japan, Austria, Italy, Spain, New Zealand, and Canada are classified as this group. These 
donors are characterized as middle powers in international politics and are relatively new 
donors, with the exception of Japan. Finally, the foreign aid of the US can be defined as 
national-security-type aid. As for the US, the containment of communism, peace in the 
Middle East, and anti-terrorism have been primary goals of its foreign aid policy.  
On the basis of the observation that until now Korea has shown a resemblance of past 
Japan in aid allocations, it is a most feasible prediction that Korea’s will go close to the 
economic relation type to which Japan belongs. We, therefore, can expect to find features 
in common between Korea and Japan in aspects other than aid allocations. 
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3. Further Comparison: The Relationship between Aid and Foreign Investment 
 
If we can safely say that both Korea and Japan belong to the same category of 
economic relation aid and that they highly take into account the economic ties with the 
recipients, the two countries’ aid may have some relationships with their foreign 
investment unlike aid from other donors. Therefore, beyond the basic comparison in aid, 
this paper will go further in addressing the question of whether the analogy between the 
two can be found in the relationship between aid and foreign investment. In particular, we 
will focus on whether Korea’s and Japan’s aid draw in foreign direct investment into the 
recipient developing countries, and whether the effects, if any, can not be found from aid 
by other donors. If such a phenomenon is discovered, we can suppose that aid of that type 
is more conducive to investment promotion of the recipients than those of other types. 
  
3.1. Literature Review 
 
The relationships between official flows and private flows have continuously been a 
concern in development economics. For instance, international financial organizations 
such as World Bank and IMF have been very interested in whether multinational lending 
has a catalytic effect or a crowding-out effect on private capital flow. Regarding the issue, 
some theoretical and empirical studies were suggested and World Bank (2000, p.98) 
provides a brief survey of those studies.  
There are, however, very few studies about the relationships between bilateral aid and 
private foreign investment. Alesina and Dollar (2000) compare determinants of aid 
allocation and FDI location choice using pooled country data, and conclude that aid and 
FDI are determined by different factors. Strategic factors such as political allies and 
colonial ties play a significant role in aid allocation, while in the location choice of FDI 
economic factors such as the enforceability of contracts and openness are considered 
often.  Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) deal with the relationships between aid and FDI more 
directly. They analyze the determinants of aid allocation by donor and don’t find a 
significant relationship between aid and FDI flows in most of the donor countries. In 
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contrast, trade relations appear to be reflected in aid allocation. Their causality is in the 
opposite direction of ours, because they investigate whether donors take into account 
their overseas investment distribution when providing aid.  
Returning to our causality direction from official aid to private capital flows, 
theoretically we can not determine whether aid will catalyze or dampen private foreign 
investment. On a theoretical basis, it has both effects: aid may raise the productivity of 
private capital by financing public infrastructure investments, but it may also have an 
adverse impact by creating rent-seeking opportunities. Selaya and Sunesen (2008) gain 
the same result, indeterminacy of aid effect on private investment by distinguishing aid 
for financing complementary inputs and aid for physical capital transfers. 
Empirical studies on the effect of aid on foreign investment show confusing outcomes 
just as they support the theoretical conclusion. Harms and Matthias (2006) find that 
controlling for countries' institutional environments, higher aid has no effect on private 
foreign investment. Unexpectedly, however, the effect is strictly positive when investors 
face a substantial regulatory burden. Selaya and Sunesen (2008) show different outcomes 
from those of Harms and Matthias (2006). Their results show that aid invested in 
complementary inputs such as social and economic infrastructure draws in foreign capital, 
while aid directly invested in physical capital crowds out private foreign investments.  
Both of the above empirical studies are based on the analysis of total aid and total 
private flows of each recipient. Recently, empirical analyses based on more micro-level 
data are being attempted by using data of donor-recipient pairs instead of the total values 
of each recipient. Concretely, while the previous study is to check whether total aid to 
recipient j increases total foreign investment flows to recipient j, the recent one is to 
check whether bilateral aid from donor i to recipient j attracts bilateral investment from i 
to j. Using pooled data by pair and the gravity model of bilateral FDI, Mayer (2006) 
examines the catalyzing effect of bilateral aid to bilateral foreign investment. The 
outcomes are not very clear and sometimes inconsistent with the theoretical basis. The 
bilateral aid appears to have a positive, significant impact on bilateral FDI when only the 
year fixed effect is imposed, but the significance disappears when the country fixed effect 
is added. If aid is limited to the aid for economic infrastructure, the impact of bilateral aid 
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loses its significance and, instead, total economic infrastructure aid received is strongly 
associated with foreign investment. 
Kimura and Todo (2007) use a similar methodology but gain different results. The 
effect of the total stock of foreign aid from all donor countries to country j on FDI from 
county i to j is positive but insignificant.1 Also, after separating infrastructure and non-
infrastructure aid, the results are the same.2 To pool the pair data for five donors and 
control for fixed effects and endogeneity, the results indicate that foreign aid has no 
significant effect on FDI from the donor country.3 They go further to investigate the 
effect by donor separately. Only the positive effect of Japanese aid for infrastructure is 
robust and significant in their estimation, while aid from other donor countries reveals no 
such effect. Only in Japanese aid is the so-called vanguard effect found, which arises 
when foreign aid from a particular donor country promotes FDI from the same country 
but not from other countries. Kimura and Todo (2007) are in the same line with Blaise 
(2005), which shows that Japanese aid flows did have a significant positive impact on 
private investors’ location choices in China. Kimura and Todo (2007) show originality by 
including a donor dummy and its interaction terms in the estimation, which reveals the 
aid effect on foreign investment varying according to donor.  
 
3.2. Configuration of aid and foreign investment in Korea and Japan 
 
Figure 2 shows the trend of overseas investments from Korea and Japan respectively. 
It is noticeable that the periods chosen for comparison coincide with a booming period of 
foreign investment in both countries, the second half of 1980s and the years after 2002 in 
Japan and Korea, respectively. Also, they were the periods when both countries 
accumulated large foreign reserves and started to increase their foreign aids significantly. 
This coincidence seemingly implies some possible relationship between aid and FDI in 
the two countries. 
Table 3 shows the top ten host countries of aid and foreign investment from Korea 
and Japan. Several developing countries, at the same time, are included in the top 
                                                 
1 This result is consistent with Harms and Matthias (2006) based on data of total values by recipient. 
2 This result is inconsistent with Selaya and Sunesen (2008) based on data of total values by recipient. 
3 This result is consistent with Mayer (2006) under the condition of the country fixed effect. 
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recipient groups of both FDI and aid. In 1989, five countries out of Japan’s top ten aid 
recipients were also top-ten host countries for Japan’s foreign investment. In 2004 the 
number reduced to three countries. In the case of Korea as a donor, three developing 
countries appear in both top ten lists in 2004.  It is not obvious whether such overlapping 
of major receiving countries in FDI and aid indicates a significant relationship between 
aid and investment. More sophisticated analysis is necessary to certify the relationship.  
 
3.3. Model 
 
In this section, using statistical methods, we will examine whether aid in general has 
a catalyzing effect on foreign investment and, furthermore, whether aid from Korea or 
Japan in particular has such an effect as distinguished from aid by other donors. For this 
estimation, we employ the gravity model of FDI and bilateral country pair data instead of 
aggregate data of recipients. We choose seven donor countries (the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and France) which are 
supposed to represent each type of aid according to Table 2. First, in order to check 
whether the catalyzing effect of aid exists across all donors, we will estimate with pooled 
country pair data. Then, we will estimate with bilateral data by donor to see whether 
there are differences in the effect among donors. 
We present a formal model to estimate the effect of foreign aid on FDI flows. To 
provide information on how foreign aid affects FDI, we make use of the knowledge-
capital model developed by Markusen (2002). Following the spirit of existing work on 
the empirics of FDI, we begin with a basic specification. Assume the following FDI 
determination equation in country i in year t. 
 
,)1( 121 ittiititit vXFf +++′+−+= − ωηβαα                     (1) 
 
where itf  is FDI flows into country i  in year t , and 1−itF represents accumulated stock of 
FDI flows until year 1−t , which reflects the accumulation effect. itX  represents a vector 
of other independent variables and 1α , 2α , and β′  are the parameters to be estimated. tω  
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is the time-specific effect, as a fixed, unknown constant, which is equivalent to putting 
time dummies in the regression. iη  reflects country-specific effect and itv  is a well-
defined stochastic error-term. 
Traditional studies on FDI decisions show four main factors: agglomeration effects, 
institution effects, production cost effects, and market access effects. First, agglomeration 
effects might be due to positive linkages between projects. One incentive is the spillover 
effects created by research and development. The second is confidence and the possibility 
that firms cluster. For example, firms are not sure as to whether a particular country 
(region) is a good location for FDI and thus take the success of one firm as a signal of 
underlying national (regional) characteristics. A third incentive arises from the supply of 
intermediate goods (see Fujita et al., 1999 for a general overview). 
Second, most countries have tried to attract FDI via favorable economic policies, 
which are called institution effects. They include various institutional reforms, the 
establishment of special economic zones, and construction of new roads. For China, Chen 
(1996) and Cheng and Kwan (2000) show that special economic zones and infrastructure 
(road) lead to lower setup costs for new, local establishments in host countries and thus 
promote FDI. 
Third, lower production costs may contribute to attracting multinationals. Switching 
from direct exports to local production will bring cost savings through lower factor costs, 
lower transport costs, and no trade barriers. Obviously, local production can save through 
avoiding transport costs and trade barriers such as tariffs and other non-trade barriers. 
Furthermore, for example, local production with collaboration with local firms through 
joint ventures can decrease the costs of dealing with foreign regulations, taxes, and 
administration. Theoretical modeling based on distinct firms with increasing returns to 
scale predicts that FDI is more likely to replace exports the larger is the market, because 
the plant-specific fixed costs may be spread over more units of output as the market size 
increases.4 In addition, a significant part of multinational activity tends to take the form 
                                                 
4 Conventional neoclassical models of MNEs view exports and FDI as substitutes, particularly in 
the manufacturing sector. In addition, if FDI is directed to industries in which the home country 
has comparative advantages, then imports and FDI are likely to be positively related. In particular, 
new products require specific skills and knowledge so that effective maintenance and support can 
be provided. The home country may also find quality supervision more effective if it directly 
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of firms shifting a state of their production process to low-cost locations. The economic 
analysis of this shift is based on the idea that different parts of the production process 
have different input requirements. For example, it may be profitable to move production 
of labor-intensive goods to labor-abundant countries, while the headquarter services are 
left in the home country (Helpman, 1984, 1985; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
Fourth, there is a market access effect. Larger markets in terms of per capita income 
will tend to have more local firms, and consequently more intense competition than 
smaller markets. This will lead to a lower price and will be particularly damaging to the 
profitability of exporting, tipping a firm's decision in favor of local production 
(Horstmann and Markusen 1987; Markusen and Venables, 1999). 
 To shed light on this issue, the choice of control variables is based on the list of 
determinants on FDI location that are reviewed in related literature. The first group of 
independent variables is country characteristics. We used the GDP of recipient countries. 
We expect that FDI flow correlates positively with GDP, consistent with a market-
seeking FDI theory. As the second variable, this specification used the difference of per 
capita GDP between source and recipient countries. We expect its coefficient to be 
positive in FDI flow, because the factor proportion hypothesis says that firms may decide 
to relocate the stages of production abroad to take advantage of factor price differences.  
The second independent variable is the lagged value of accumulated FDI. This 
variable reflects agglomeration effects. The third group of independent variables 
measures perceived costs of exporting to the host country. DISTij is the geographic 
distance between i and j, and TARi is the average tariff rate for the country. These control 
variables reflect trade-off relations between FDI and direct exports. As is clear, switching 
from direct exports to local production provides cost savings by avoiding transport costs, 
trade barriers such as tariffs, and non-trade barriers. 
The fourth group of independent variables is the institutional environment variable 
that reflects the institution effect, which plays an important role in attracting FDI. As an 
institutional environment variable, corruption indices of recipient countries are used.  
                                                                                                                                                 
controls the network. Hence, whether exports and FDI are substitutes or complements needs to be 
resolved empirically. 
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Finally, we used bilateral exports between source and recipient countries as 
independent variables. According to FDI literature, there are still debates about the 
relationship between FDI and exports. There are theoretical reasons to suggest both 
substitution and complementary effects.5 
 
3.4. Estimation method 
 
Give equation (1), we employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
framework to estimate the impact of foreign aid on FDI. Since FDI flows itf  can be 
rewritten as ,1−− itit FF equation (1) can be rewritten as a dynamic panel regression form: 
 
.,...,2,1,,...,2,1,
,121
TtNivu
uXFF
ittiit
itititit
==++=
+′++= −
ωη
βαα
                    (2) 
 
This equation is a dynamic panel regression with a lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side.  
It is important to ascertain the serial correlation property of the disturbances in our 
dynamic model, which is crucial for formulating an appropriate estimation procedure. 
And, the issue of reverse causality should be addressed. We have to deal with the 
potential endogeneity issue of both the lagged dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables arising from the feedback effects of FDI on control variables that are lagged 
accumulated stock of FDI and other economic and institutional factors in our study. 
These econometric issues should be properly considered for a model specification and its 
estimation. 
Following Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover 
(1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998), the above-mentioned econometric issues under a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) framework are considered. 
                                                 
5 Lipsey and Weiss (1981), Graham (1996), and Kawai and Urata (1998) find that affiliates’ sales 
positively correlated with exports and foreign production. In particular, Lipsey, Ramstetter, and 
Blomstrom (2000) using Japanese manufacturing firms find that parent companies’ exports from 
Japan to a foreign region are positively related to production in that region by the affiliates of that 
parent. 
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The GMM approach starts with the first-differenced version of equation (2). 
 
,,...,2,1,,...,2,1,12 TtNiuXFF itititit ==∆+∆′+∆=∆ − βα           (3) 
 
The country-specific effects are eliminated by the difference and ∆ represents the first 
difference of each variable. 
Under the assumption of serially uncorrelated level residuals, values of F  lagged two 
periods or more qualify as instruments in the first-differenced system, implying the 
following moment conditions: 
 
.2 and ,...,30][ ≥==∆− sTtforuFE itsit                      (4) 
 
In addition, we make use of the explanatory variables as additional instruments as follows. 
Here, the issue of endogeneity due to reverse causality becomes critical. For strictly 
exogenous explanatory variables, both past and future X∆ are valid instruments: 
 
. all and ,...,30][ sTtforuXE itsit ==∆∆ −                        (5) 
 
But using conditions (5) for 2<s  will lead to inconsistent estimates if reverse causality 
exists in the sense that 0][ ≠itisuXE  for .ts ≥  Instead, one may assume X  to be weakly 
exogenous, i.e., 0][ =itisuXE  for ,ts <  which implies the following subset of conditions 
(5): 
 
.2 and ,...,30][ ≥==∆∆ − sTtuXE itsit                       (6) 
 
Equations (4)–(6) imply a set of linear moment conditions to which the standard 
GMM methodology applies. The consistency of the GMM estimator hinges on the 
validity of these moment conditions, which, in turn, depends on maintained hypotheses of 
the level residuals being serially uncorrelated and the strictly or weakly exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. It is therefore essential to ensure that these assumptions are 
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justified by conducting specification tests (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
It should be noted that the first-differencing operation not only eliminates unobserved 
country-specific effects, but also time-invariant explanatory variables for which only 
cross-sectional information is available. In addition, under a random-effect model, the 
first-differenced GMM estimator can suffer from serious efficiency loss, for there are 
potentially informative moment conditions that are ignored in the first-difference 
equation (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Thus, additional moment conditions that make use 
of information in the level equation (1) can be useful information. 
Following Blundell and Bond (1998), we augment the first-differenced moment 
conditions (4)–(6) by the level moment conditions: 
 
,,...,30][ 1 TtFuE itit ==∆ −                            (7) 
 
which amounts to using lagged differences of F  as instruments in the level equation (1).  
In addition, for strictly exogenous explanatory variables, the appropriate level 
moment conditions would be 
 
. all and ,,...,30][ sTtXuE sitit ==∆ −                     (8) 
 
For weakly exogenous explanatory variables, the level moment conditions are  
 
.1 all and ,,...,30][ ≥==∆ − sTtXuE sitit                    (9) 
 
The dynamic panel system GMM estimator is obtained by imposing both the set of 
moment conditions (7)–(9) and (4)–(6). By exploiting more moment conditions, the 
system GMM estimator is more efficient than the first-differenced GMM estimator that 
uses only a subset (4)–(6).  
 
3.5. Data 
 
Bilateral FDI flows are drawn from UNCTAD, which covers 249 countries from 1968 
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to 2003. Since the data for foreign aid covers seven donor countries from the limited 
period from 1980 to 2006, we limit our sample to the period from 1980 to 2003 covering 
the seven donor countries and twenty-four recipient countries (Appendix Table 1).  
The foreign aid data used in this paper are taken from the OECD.dat database. The 
data contains the bilateral foreign aid funded to each activity. The dataset provides two 
types of bilateral foreign aid: the total amount of foreign aid and loans. In this paper we 
used the total amount of foreign aid. The data is available in annual series from 1980 to 
2006. Other independent variables are taken from the World Bank: GDP, per capita GDP, 
exports, and mean tariffs. Distance between two countries is defined as the geographical 
distance between the capital cities of these countries (kilometers), from Jon Haveman’s 
website.6  
For institutional environment variables, we use corruption Indices, constructed by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The data set has a feature of a panel structure 
consisting of 3,816 annual observations clustered by 168 country pair groups from 1980 
to 2003. The number of observations varies per year and summary statistics for all of the 
data used in the estimation are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
3.6. Estimation results 
 
The estimation results for equation (2) are reported in Table 5. Table 5 presents the 
estimation results by fixed- and random-effect panel models, and dynamic panel system 
GMM estimation. Economic variables are shown to be significant independent of the 
estimation methods, although the size of coefficients is different.  
First, accumulated stock of FDI is positively and significantly correlated with current 
FDI flows, implying positive linkages among projects: spillover effects, cluster 
confidence, and uses of intermediate goods. Second, the difference of per capita GDP 
between source and recipient countries is positive in FDI flow. This result supports the 
factor proportion that multinationals arise to take advantage of international factor-price 
differences. 
                                                 
6 http://www.macalester.edu/research/economi cs/PAGE/HAVEMAN.  
 17
Third, there is a positive correlation between recipient countries’ GDP and FDI at a 
1% significance level. This result is very consistent with our expectation. This indicates 
that FDI flows are more attractive in larger markets, which is consistent with market-
seeking FDI. The horizontal FDI states that, given moderate to high trade costs and plant-
level as well as firm-level scale economies, multinational activity will occur between 
similar countries. The fixed costs of two-plant firms are less than double those of a 
single-plant firm, and therein lies the motive for multinational production.  
Fourth, exports show a positive coefficient, although it is not significant. The 
conventional view of the tradeoff in relation between FDI and exports is not supported 
empirically. Some companies establish subsidiaries that can produce the same products as 
their parent company. This production results in lower transport costs that direct exports 
from the parent country, no tariffs, and the seller can more easily adapt to the host 
country’s tastes, customs, and legal requirements. Thus, establishment might result in 
lower exports directly from the parent country and thus there is substitution between local 
production and exports. However, there are several reasons to be complementary (Caves 
et al., 2002). Graham and Krugman (1993) argue that, for some industries, foreign 
investment is likely to be complementary to trade. Baldwin (1990) suggests that 
downstream services are typically associated with the level of export sales from the 
parent country to the host country. Some of these facilities can be set up by locals, 
although parent country involvement may be beneficial. 
Fifth, the tariff level that reflects the trade barrier shows positive and significant 
effects. This implies that multinationals tend to invest more in the countries with higher 
tariff rates because they can avoid trade barriers. 
Sixth, the institution environment effect is shown to be negative and significant 
throughout the whole model specifications. This justifies the view that better institutions, 
i.e., an environment favorable to foreign multinationals, plays a significant role in 
promoting FDI. 
Finally the foreign aid variables of interest, which are the most important variables 
throughout this study, present that the coefficient for foreign aid is negatively correlated 
with bilateral FDI flows. The coefficient, however, is not significant. This indicates that 
there is no empirical evidence that the more foreign aid to a recipient country creates 
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higher investment to the country in general.  
Considering possible endogeneity of independent variables, column (3) of Table 5 
shows the estimation results of the panel system GMM estimation. The foreign aid is still 
negatively correlated with FDI, but insignificant. This means foreign aid does not play 
positive roles in attracting FDI, generally in the sense that the data used are pooled for all 
seven donors. Furthermore, the model specification satisfies specification tests and AR 
tests.  
Some of the findings, so far, suggest that foreign aid does not create FDI. This 
analysis cannot catch, however, the impact of foreign aid on FDI flows by each of seven 
donor countries. Therefore, we further investigate whether foreign aid from each of donor 
countries actually promotes FDI. As discussed in the previous section, we simply guess 
that there is different impact by each of four types of foreign aid. Based on this 
assumption, for example, aid of an economic relation type is highly connected with trade 
or FDI flows.  
Estimates for each of seven donor countries are reported in Table 6. Columns (1) and 
(2) present the estimation results by fixed- and random-effect panel models, while 
column (3) shows those of the dynamic panel system GMM estimation. The impact of 
foreign aid on FDI flows shows different results between donor countries. As the 
estimates in Table 6 indicate, in the random effect panel model, column (2), the foreign 
aid from Germany and France has significant negative impact on bilateral FDI flows. 
After controlling endogeneity problems, however, the coefficient of the GMM method for 
these countries has no significant impact on FDI.  
Interestingly, bilateral foreign aid from Japan and South Korea has significant 
impacts on bilateral FDI flows for all methods. This indicates that foreign aid from Japan 
and South Korea creates bilateral FDI. In contrast, foreign aid from the Netherlands is 
negatively and significantly correlated with bilateral FDI for all estimation methods. This 
means that foreign aid from the Netherlands is likely to be substitute for FDI.  
As discussed in the previous section, on a theoretical basis, it is not obvious whether 
foreign aid increases or reduces countries' attractiveness for foreign investors. The 
empirical evidence in this paper shows that foreign aid does not promote bilateral FDI in 
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general. There are different impacts for each donor country according to foreign aid types. 
Japanese and Korean foreign aid increase bilateral FDI flows, while that from the 
Netherlands reduces FDI flows.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Korea’s current foreign aid has shown close similarities to that of Japan in the 1980s. 
This similarity is very clear in aid fund allocations by type, region, income, and sector. 
Such similarity is found also in the micro level, the relationship between official aid 
flows, and private capital flows.  
In general, we can’t find a positive effect of aid on foreign investment inflow, which 
is consistent with the previous results. However, our results show that only aid from 
Korea and Japan is followed by more inflow of foreign investment. The effect is stronger 
for Korean aid than Japanese aid. In contrast, for the other donors, aid is closer to the 
substitute for private foreign investment than the complement to it. Aid from the 
Netherlands belonging to humanitarianism type shows the substitute effects very clearly. 
Our results imply that Korean aid practices have already come very close to the 
economic relation type, which includes Japan, and both countries’ aid works as a 
vanguard for their investors in the developing countries. Now, it is an open question how 
such a role of aid will be assessed by international society. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of Korea's ODA 
(unit: mil.US$, %) 
 
Sources: OECD.dat. 
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Table 1. Comparisons between Korea and Japan in aid allocations 
(unit: %) 
Korea Japan DAC Average  
2002–2006* 1985–1986 2002–2006 2002–2006 
Size      
 Total (US$ mil.) 488 7,892 15,426 4,294 
 Share in GNI 0.06 0.3 0.23 0.28 
Type      
 Grants 59 (31) 37 53 87 
 Loans 41 (69) 63 47 13 
By region      
 Europe 4 2 1 4 
 Africa 8 16 10 29 
 America 5 8 7 9 
 Asia 76 67 60 33 
 unspecified 7 7 22 25 
By income      
 LDCs 24 21 16 26 
 other LICs 14 12 19 10 
 LMIC 52 53 39 30 
 UMICs 3 6 4 3 
 unallocated 7 8 22 30 
By sector      
 Social Infra 63 (45) 23 36 58 
 Economic Infra 29 (46) 51 45 21 
 Others 8 (9) 26 19 21 
Tying      
 Share of tying 97 32 8 8 
*Values in parenthesis indicate the average of the years from 1998 to 2001. These are presented 
to correct a shock arising from a temporary rise in the aid to Afghanistan and Iraq after 2002. 
Sources: OECD.stat. 
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Table 2. Typology of Foreign Aid 
             Size (per GNI) 
    Type 
Over 0.5% 0.3–0.5% Below 0.3% 
Humanitarianism 
Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway, Netherlands
Finland, Germany, 
Swiss, Ireland 
 
Ex-colony 
Management 
France Belgium 
United Kingdom, 
Australia, Portugal  
Economic 
Relation 
 Canada, Austria 
Japan, Italy, Greece, 
New Zealand, Spain 
National 
Security 
  United States 
* The size of aid as a percentage of GNI is as of 2004. 
Sources: Park (2007). 
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Figure 2. Fluctuation of Overseas Investment Flows from Korea and Japan 
(unit: mil. US $)  
 
Sources: UNCTAD. 
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Table 3. Top 10 host countries of FDI and Aid from Japan and Korea 
Japan Korea 
1989 2004 2004 
FDI Aid FDI Aid FDI Aid 
Thailand Indonesia China China China Iraq 
Malaysia China Thailand Iraq Vietnam Vietnam 
Indonesia Thailand Korea Vietnam Slovakia China 
Korea Philippines Taiwan Malaysia Peru Cambodia 
Taiwan Bangladesh Mexico Philippines Indonesia Afghanistan 
China India Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Bangladesh 
Brazil Sri Lanka Indonesia Afghanistan India Indonesia 
Myanmar Pakistan Brazil Kazakhstan Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Philippines Nigeria Czech Pakistan Poland Philippines 
Pakistan Kenya Malaysia Uzbekistan Libya Albania 
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economy Korea; Ministry of Finance Japan; OECD.dat. 
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Table4. Data Description 
    Mean Standard  deviation 
lnFDIij  Log of F 야 stock from country i to j 0.749648 2.452518
lnODAij Log of aid stock from country i to j 1.652899 2.148234
lnGDPi Log of GDP of donor country i 27.78015 1.069315
lnGDPj Log of GDP of recipient country j 24.00601 1.638917
lnEXPij Log of export from country i to j 18.90843 2.321851
lnDiff_PGDP Difference in log of Per Capita GDP between i and j 9.543745 0.771756
lnCorruptionj Log of Corruption index in country j  0.692524 0.597787
lnDISij Log of distance between I and j  8.488311 0.504878
lnTARj  Log of tariff rates in country j  0.956205 1.299249
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Table 5. Impact of foreign aid on bilateral FDI flows 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Fixed effect Random effect GMM 
Lagged Accu. FDIij 0.044 0.058 0.541 
 (0.011)*** (0.012)*** (0.043)*** 
ODAij -0.014 -0.032 -0.015 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) 
GDPj 0.721 0.547 0.211 
 (0.013)*** (0.089)*** (0.086)*** 
Diff. Per Capita GDPij 0.138 0.208 0.126 
 (0.078)* (0.069)*** (0.068)* 
DISij  -0.348  
  (0.305)  
TARj 0.165 0.222 0.025 
 (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.012)** 
EXPij 0.007 0.019 0.031 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.038) 
Institutional ENVj -0.194 -0.176 -0.069 
 (0.059)*** (0.059)*** (0.032)** 
    
Obs.  3646 3646 2878 
R-sq 0.09 0.09  
AR(1)   0.000  
AR(2)   0.065  
Hansen test      0.000  
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Table 6. Impact of foreign aid on bilateral FDI flows by donor country 
        Depend. Var. = bilateral FDI 
  (1) (2)    (3)   
    Fixed effect Random effect Obs.   GMM Obs. 
ODAij        
Germany  -0.095 -0.149 537  -0.024 428 
  (0.069) (0.065)**   (0.043)   
France  -0.053 -0.144 524  -0.041 409 
  (0.076) (0.073)**   (0.069)  
United Kingdom  0.108 0.069 524  0.032 410 
  (0.075) (0.074)   (0.052)  
Japan  0.063 0.013 537  0.003 419 
  (0.039)** (0.011)*   (0.002)*  
Korea  0.147 0.137 458  0.062 368 
  (0.059)** (0.057)**   (0.036)*  
Netherlands  -0.141 -0.132 539  -0.029 433 
  (0.052)*** (0.051)**   (0.021)*  
United States  -0.046 -0.057 527  0.011 411 
  (0.053) (0.052)     (0.038)   
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Appendix Table 1 
Country List 
  Donor country Recipient country 
1 France Bolivia 
2 Germany Brazil 
3 Japan Chile 
4 Korea Costa Rica 
5 Netherlands Algeria 
6 United Kingdom Indonesia 
7 United States India 
8  Cambodia 
9  Kazakhstan 
10  Sri Lanka 
11  Myanmar(Burma) 
12  Mongolia 
13  Mexico 
14  Malaysia 
15  Nepal 
16  Peru 
17  Philippines 
18  Pakistan 
19  Singapore 
20  El Salvador 
21  Thailand 
22  Turkey 
23  Venezuela 
24   Zimbabwe 
 
